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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
In addition to the issues described in the brief of CSB, 
Smithfield Livestock Auction considers the following issues 
relevant to this appeal: 
1. Does the printed statement on the back of the Smithfield 
check constitute a restrictive endorsement? 
2. Is CSB estopped from bringing this action against 
Smithfield by reason of its delay and liquidation of other 
collateral without notice to Smithfield? 
3. By a policy of allowing intermittent sales of livestock, 
has CSB waived its lien on intermittent cattle sales at 
Smithfield? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Smithfield acquiesces in the statement of the case made by 
CSB with the following corrections. 
CSB states in its brief that upon default of the Erickson 
loan in April of 1983, CSB repossessed and sold the various items 
of collateral and attempted to locate the livestock with no 
success. See Brief of Appellant at 3. Following this 
introduction, the statement is made that: 
[F]ollowing sale of the collateral, a deficiency balance 
remained. CSB subsequently learned of the fact of the 
livestock sale and brought its suit on April 29, 1985, 
claiming damages for conversion against Smithfield. 
Id. That statement is substantially erroneous. The evidence was 
that CSB learned in the spring of 1983 that some of the cattle of 
Erickson had been sold through Smithfield. Reporter's Transcript 
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at 64-66. The statement in Appellant's brief misstates this 
critical item of evidence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts cited by CSB are correct as stated. However, 
substantial and critical facts forming a basis for the court's 
Findings of Fact are not stated nor fully documented. For this 
reason Smithfield provides additional statement of fact to 
supplement those provided in the brief of CSB. 
1. There was a lack of evidence that the cattle sold by 
Smithfield were the same cattle upon which CSB had a lien. The 
trial court in reviewing this evidence stated: 
"Whose livestock it was we can assume and I would certainly 
guess that certainly a portion of it or a good portion of it 
was probably Mr. Ericksons, but I would be speculating to 
say that all of the cattle of this amount of money was 
cattle of Mr. Erickson's upon which there was a lien. I 
don't know that. I have to assume it. There is good 
circumstantial evidence that certainly part of it was, and 
maybe a major portion of it was, but I don't know how much. 
So I would have to speculate to come up with that exact 
figure." 
Reporter's Transcript at page 106, lines 7-16. 
2. Plaintiff's own witness, Dennis Yeates, indicated that 
the endorsement on the back side of Smithfield's check was 
regarded by CSB as a restrictive endorsement. Reporter's 
Transcript at page 54, lines 5-12, lines 22-25; page 57, lines 
21-22. He indicated that as an experienced bank officer he would 
accept it as such. He also testified that because of this 
endorsement it would reguire special handling by CSB before 
credit would be given on the check. Reporter's Transcript at 
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page 49, line 25 to page 50, line 22? page 59, line 23 to page 
60, line 1; page 61, lines 16-24. This special procedure 
required that an officer would have to approve the granting of 
credit thereon under the then current bank procedures* Id. This 
portion of the Reporter's Transcript (pages 46-64) is 
sufficiently critical and illustrative of the defense of 
Smithfield that it has been copied and attached to this brief as 
Appendix #1. 
3. CSB elected to grant credit to Erickson in his checking 
account for each check deposited and made no effort to offset or 
inquire regarding the livestock sale shown thereon to have been 
the source of the proceeds. That Plaintiff knew or should have 
known of its own lien position on livestock at the time the 
checks were presented to it* Reporter's Tranacript at page 55, 
lines 15-19; page 57, lines 2-10. 
4. That Plaintiff had a regular procedure of acquiescence 
in the sale of livestock even though the same were liened in the 
event the herd size remained the same. Reporter's Transcript at 
pages 33-39, pages 41-45. 
5. That Plaintiff pursuant to this policy would not object 
and would acquiesce in Ericksonfs sale of livestock from time to 
time and did not require borrowers such as Erickson to obtain 
permission when selling small numbers of livestock or culling 
cows. The Plaintiff only required its release to be given in the 
event of a bulk sale of the livestock covered by the lien. Id. 
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6. That Plaintiff filed a complaint objecting to the 
bankruptcy discharge of Erickson. Plaintiff pursued that 
litigation without notice to Defendant of the litigation, the 
claims which might arise against Defendant or even notice to 
Defendant of Erickson's bankruptcy- Plaintiff, in fact, had 
notice in the Spring of 1983 of checks to Erickson for sale of 
livestock through Defendant's auction. Yet Plaintiff gave no 
notice of any claim to Defendant until the institution of this 
lawsuit several years later. No reason for the lack of notice 
was presented to the court. Plaintiff admitted full notice of 
the check payments to Erickson by Defendant. Reporter's 
Transcript at 65-67. 
7. Plaintiff proceeded to liquidate other collateral for 
the loan, enter into releases of collateral to Erickson without 
verifiable explanations and otherwise settle the matter without 
the presentation of any claim for deficiency to Defendant. 
Reporter's Transcript at pages 67-75. No evidence was presented 
to the court that the liquidations were conducted reasonably or 
at fair market value. Id. Plaintiff also admitted it released 
collateral to Erickson for less than appraised value. Plaintiff 
also admitted it made no bona fide effort to locate the balance 
of the livestock or significant pieces of equipment. All this 
was done without notice of claim of any kind to Defendant. Id. 
8. The activities of Plaintiff in liquidating the 
collateral without notifying Defendant of the possibility of a 
claim and further under the procedures exercised, factually 
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supports the legal defense of waiver and estoppel. Reporter1s 
Transcript at pages 106-108. 
9. That even after the Plaintiff's liguidation under its 
own procedures there was a deficiency of only $15,919.66 as of 
March 14, 1985. Reporter's Transcript at page 103. 
10. That Plaintiff waited almost three years after 
receiving the checks and two years after its knowledge of 
Erickson's default to present any claim to Defendant. 
CITATION OF RELEVANT LAW 
In addition to the law cited by CSB in its brief, Smithfield 
relies upon the following statutes in support of its arguments: 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 70A-3-203 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 70A-3-206 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 70A-3-304 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 70A-3-4Q6 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 70A-3-603(1)(b) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case presents conflicting issues of constructive and 
actual notice. The trial court1s decision is factually based on 
a unique set of circumstances. From that amalgam of facts as a 
whole the trial court found waiver and estoppel to be valid 
defenses. Further, the court found a lack of evidence proving 
conversion. 
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I. THE SMITHFIELD CHECKS CONTAIN A RESTRICTIVE ENDORSEMENT. 
The endorsement is both restrictive and conditional 
especially where CSB is the accepting Bank. 
II. SECTION 70A-4-203 REQUIRES THAT CSB COMPLY WITH THE 
RESTRICTIVE ENDORSEMENT OF THE SMITHFIELD CHECK. 
By the clear terms of the endorsement CSB either complied 
with it by releasing its lien or violated its terms. Section 
70A-4-203 specifically exempts its protection when restrictive 
endorsements are involved. While there might be some question if 
an innocent third party were involved, CSB cannot claim such 
protection. 
III. CSB FAILED TO PROVE CONVERSION BY SMITHFIELD. 
CSB failed to document that the cows sold were liened to it. 
Furthermore, CSB had a policy of allowing the very type of sales 
done by Smithfield. 
IV. CSB'S FAILURE TO TIMELY NOTIFY SMITHFIELD OF ITS CLAIM 
AND ITS HAPHAZARD HANDLING OF OTHER COLLATERAL ALSO BARS ITS 
CLAIM. 
CSB without regard to the interests of Smithfield released 
other collateral. CSB's failure to notify Smithfield and to 
liquidate in a commercially reasonable manner is an additional 
bar to recovery. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SMITHFIELD CHECKS CONTAIN A RESTRICTIVE ENDORSEMENT. 
The checks that were issued by the Defendant to William C. 
Erickson contained on the back side thereof the following printed 
endorsement instructions: 
6 
i 
"In executing my endorsement of this check I do sell to the 
Smithfield Livestock Auction, Inc., the herein described 
Livestock and guarantee that I am the owner of said 
Livestock and that said Livestock are clear of all mortgage 
liens or encumbrances. If Livestock are mortgaged, 
mortgagee's endorsement or release of mortgage is required. 
Please endorse below.ff 
Exhibit 5. (Emphasis added). 
Clearly the instructions require that if the livestock are 
mortgaged that the mortgagee must endorse the check or 
alternatively that a release of mortgage is required. The 
mortgagee is Commercial Security Bank. The check states on it 
that a mortgagee endorsement is required in the event the cows 
are mortgaged. An accepting bank which is unaware of the 
mortgage might be able to circumvent that restriction by not 
having actual knowledge that the cows were mortgaged. However, 
in this case Commercial Security Bank itself held the mortgage 
and was certainly on notice of the restrictions stated on the 
check. The testimony of their own bank officer was that an 
endorsement restriction such as that contained on the back of the 
Smithfield checks would require clearance by a particular bank 
officer. A bank officer reading this restrictive endorsement 
would have to conclude that if the bank itself had that 
endorsement by accepting these funds and paying out on them they 
are essentially guaranteeing their own endorsement or release 
thereon. Mr. Yeates, the bank's own witness and officer 
explained this situation succinctly: 
Q And an individual writes a check to Wilson Motor, 
$3,000, for a new car and puts on that check, ,fThis check is 
payment in full for all liens and encumbrances on automobile 
such-and-such,'1 and then Wilson Motor endorses that check 
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and wants to deposit it in your bank, and you know the bank 
has a lien on their car. What would the teller do? Is that 
a restrictive endorsement? 
A That's correct. 
Q What should the teller do? 
A Well, I would think she would normally take it to 
an officer, if you're talking about an automobile for a 
check that size, she'd take to an officer. 
Q Why? 
A For protection. 
Q For protection for who? 
A For the bank. 
Q For the bank. Because the bank, by accepting that 
check, depositing it and then using it, as a collecting bank 
may release any lien it has on Wilson's Automobile; right? 
A That's correct. 
Reporter's Transcript at page 49, lines 4-24. 
Even if the court were to consider this other than a 
restrictive endorsement, the bank officer's testimony as to how 
the instrument was actually handled or would be handled in the 
course of its negotiation by Commercial Security Bank provides 
significant evidence that the Bank would be a knowing participant 
in allowing this check to be cashed without an appropriate 
endorsement or release relative to the livestock sold. At best 
CSB is contributorily negligent in allowing its own debtor to 
pass such an endorsement through CSB and obtain funds thereon. 
POINT II 
SECTION 70A-4-203 REQUIRES THAT CSB COMPLY WITH 
THE RESTRICTIVE ENDORSEMENT OF THE SMITHFIELD CHECK. 
CSB argues that Section 70A-4-203 exempts Commercial 
Security Bank from any notice or responsibility with respect to 
the restrictive endorsement. A careful reading of that Section 
does exactly the opposite for it states specifically that it is 
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"subject to the provisions of Article 3 concerning 
conversion of the instrument (Section 3-419) and the 
provisions of both Article 3 and this article concerning 
restrictive endorsements . . .ff 
Section 70A-4-203 (Emphasis added). Clearly this Section makes 
CSB subject to compliance with restrictive endorsements. CSB 
proceeds to argue that the endorsement instructions are an 
agreement between Smithfield Livestock Auction and William C. 
Erickson, the debtor. Further, that such an agreement has no 
effect on the collecting bank. However, a reading of the 
restrictive endorsement indicates the opposite. It requires of 
any parties who receive and pay out funds that they have certain 
signatures on the checks. Commercial Security Bank by accepting 
the check and paying out on it is acknowledging compliance with 
the restrictive endorsement. The conditional nature of the 
endorsement is binding upon CSB. Smithfield acknowledges that 
other banks dealing with these documents are in a different 
position because of their lack of actual knowledge of the lien 
against these cattle. 
Based on the particular set of circumstances before the 
trial court, it was proper to hold the Bank's activities in 
passing through this restrictive endorsement constitute a waiver 
and estoppel of their right to proceed .against the Defendant. 
This is especially appropriate given the fact that CSB's own 
officer testified that this type of an endorsement would require 
special handling by their Bank. Further, that the special 
handling would require permission from an officer of the bank 
before a teller would be authorized to accept such a check. 
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It is problematic how one could convert proceeds due to a 
bank when those proceeds are deposited to the very institution 
which is now claiming conversion. The Bank chose to allow Mr. 
Erickson to draw money out of his checking account. That is, the 
Bank chose to honor its position as being a debtor of Mr. 
Erickson. When Mr. Erickson deposited these funds with 
Commercial Security Bank, the Bank actually received all of the 
proceeds from the sales of whatever cows were sold at the 
Smithfield Livestock Auction. Erickson then was a creditor of 
the Bank to the amount remaining in his account. For the Bank to 
argue that it did not receive the funds flies in the face of the 
depositor/checking relationship. The Bank did receive the funds. 
The Bank's argument more succinctly stated is that it 
received the money but didn't know that it was receiving the 
money for the cows that it had a lien upon. Further that had the 
bank known that it was receiving funds for the cows it would not 
have allowed Mr. Erickson to draw those funds back out of the 
Bank. Given the fact that the check actually passed through the 
Bank's own hands, had a restrictive endorsement on it referring 
to sale of livestock and release of livestock liens, it appears 
appropriate that the Bank should be estopped from now asserting a 
complete lack of knowledge on its part. One could consider a 
comparison between Smithfieldfs constructive notice of a U.C.C. 
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filing against Erickson's cows with the actual knowledge of the 
Bank and its officers regarding the source of these funds. 
The trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint is 
properly based upon those evidentiary determinations. The brief 
of the Appellant in this matter attempts to tie the trial court's 
ruling solely to the legal issues regarding the handling of the 
restrictive endorsement by collecting banks. However, the trial 
court in this matter based its decision not only on restrictive 
endorsement law, but upon significant and peculiar and factual 
determinations in this unusual situation. 
POINT III 
CSB FAILED TO PROVE CONVERSION BY SMITHFIELD. 
In significant respects, CSB failed to provide adequate 
evidence on its conversion complaint. The trial court found that 
CSB failed to prove definitively that the cows sold by Smithfield 
Livestock Auction were cows belonging to the Plaintiff and upon 
which CSB had a proper lien position. Furthermore, there was 
significant evidence introduced by CSB's own witness that it had 
a policy of allowing sale of cull cows and sale of cows in small 
lots without assertion of its lien position. Plaintiff's witness 
indicated that CSB viewed a livestock lien more as a floating 
lien upon the herd than a lien on each cow. Mr. Yeates, an 
officer of CSB, testified that CSB did not expect the proceeds of 
cow sale to go to the Bank so long as the herd size remained the 
same. That is, they specifically allowed farmers to sell cull 
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cows and other cows from time to time as long as the herd size 
remained approximately the same. Reporter's Transcript at page 
41, line 19 to page 45, line 4. 
Q Okay. But what I'm saying is, did you object to 
this man as a regular part of his dairy and steer operation 
selling cows as long as your herd remained the same size? 
A As long as it remained the same size, you would 
have no objection 
Reporter's Transcript at page 41, lines 19-23. 
Q Okay, let me go through it again. In July Mr. 
Erickson is current, he's made you your $2,000 payment twice 
a month. He'll make the one the next month and the next 
month and so forth. But in July he takes three cows out of 
his herd, cull cows, takes them over to Smithfield Livestock 
Auction, has them sold, and gets an $1,100 check, puts it in 
his bank account. Do you expect that $1,100? 
A Did he replace the cows? 
Q Assume that he did. Do you expect the $1,100? 
A If he replaced them, no. 
Q Okay. So your really regard it as a floating lien 
on the herd and not a lien on specific cows; is that right? 
A That's correct. 
Reporter's Transcript at page 44, lines 12-24. 
It should be noted that the type of sales that occurred through 
Smithfield were of this nature. CSB also had full opportunity 
and knowledge that the cows were being sold because the funds 
were coming into their own small bank with a restrictive 
endorsement on them showing that they were for the sale of cows. 
This is a process that went on for three or four months as a 
small portion of the cattle were being sold a few at a time. CSB 
has never made any effort to account for the balance of the herd 
or for their sale in bulk. CSB has not even indicated that the 
debtor was asked. 
12 
I 
POINT IV 
CSBfS FAILURE TO TIMELY NOTIFY SMITHFIELD OF ITS CLAIM AND 
ITS HAPHAZARD HANDLING OF OTHER COLLATERAL ALSO BARS ITS 
CLAIM. 
CSB failed to advise Smithfield of this potential claim 
within a reasonable time period. CSB received Smithfield1s 
checks in the summer of 1982. CSB knew that the cattle were gone 
and that some were sold through Smithfield. No claim was filed 
against Smithfield nor was any notice given until April 26, 1985. 
Smithfield was thereby prevented from protecting its own 
interest. Instead, CSB litigated with the debtor Erickson in 
Bankruptcy Court and only after losing that case did they then 
seek to come against Smithfield. CSB also liquidated other 
collateral and failed to reasonably marshal those assets or care 
for them in a husbandlike manner. CSB simply seeks to demand the 
difference from Smithfield. 
Q What you're attempting to sue my clients for is 
some residual loss you claim on this loan; correct? 
A Thatfs correct. 
Q So your disposition of all the collateral and your 
stewardship of it reflects on how much they may be damaged 
here. 
A That's correct. 
Q So if you let go of certain kinds of collateral 
for much less than it was worth, it would increase their 
damage and liability, wouldn't it? 
A That would be a correct assumption. 
Q Particularly after you knew that they might be 
liable. Don't you think you ought to notify them that they 
might be liable so they can make an effort to protect 
themselves? 
A Well, their consideration into their liability 
didn't come—came several years later, so that wasn't even a 
thought. 
Reporter's Transcript at page 72, line 11 to page 73, line 3. In 
several cases, CSB documented that it still had liens on other 
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collateral or released them without any accounting of what was 
done with the collateral. 
Q Did you ever inquire as to what he did with the 
4010 tractor? 
A No. 
Q Who did he sell it to? 
A I can't tell you. 
Q Do you know what he sold it for? 
A He told me fifteen--
Q I'm not interested in what he told you. How much 
was it sold for? 
A I know it was sold for $lr500. 
Q Did you agree to the release? 
A Yes. 
Reporter's Transcript at page 69, lines 1-12. 
Q Okay. Does that refresh your recollection? 
A Yes. 
Q Of what you consider the value of that tractor to 
be? 
A Yes. 
Q What was the value? 
A At that time, (6/8/82) $8,000. 
Reporter's Transcript at page 70, lines 4-10, (insert of date-
reference to Reporter's Transcript at page 9, lines 5-10. 
Q Did you ever get a name of who this tractor might 
be sold to? 
A We attempted. 
Q Was it Mr. Jeppson of Malad, Idaho? 
A I couldn't tell you. We didn't find out. 
Q I want to give you this note that you say was made 
at the time of the loan again and ask you to read the bottom 
paragraph, see if that refreshes your recollection. 
A Okay. 
Q You did acguire information of who the tractor was 
sold to? 
A Right. Right. 
Q Did you call Mr. Jeppson in Malad and ask him? 
A Unable to find him. 
Q what effort did you make? 
A I can't recall. 
Q Your handwritten notes say, "Mr. Erickson would 
not give the bank the name of Mr. Jeppson to verify that it 
was a bonafide sale." Is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
14 
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Q What do you mean, it wouldn't give the name of Mr. 
Jeppson? 
A It wouldn't give us a first name. 
Q Okay. So you made no effort to determine which 
Jeppson it was in Malad? 
A I can't recall. It's too long ago. 
Q Do you know whether there was a bonafide sale? 
A It seems, and like I say I can't remember the 
details, you know—well, all I know is that he gave me a 
check for $1,500 [before bankruptcy date—April 1983] and 
said that the check represented the money he got from the 
purchase. 
Q Is that tractor still liened with a U.C.C., or did 
you release it? 
A I have no idea. 
Reporter's Transcript at page 43, line 13 to page 74, line 21 
(insert of date—reference to Reporter's Transcript at page 70, 
line 24-25) . 
In this one example with virtually no documentation or 
effort at verification, CSB releases a tractor it valued at 
$8,000 for $1,500 ten months after the loan was made. Inasmuch as 
CSB had notice in 1982 that cattle had been sold through 
Smithfield, thereafter the CSB procedures to collect the loan 
affected materially the financial interest of Smithfield. CSB's 
activities in failing to reasonably marshall collateral and to 
release collateral without reasonable accounting all worked to 
the detriment of Smithfield. The court found that Commercial 
Security Bank had not demonstrated that it had acted in a 
commercially reasonable manner with respect to the liquidation of 
collateral. 
In other words, if they had sold all of the personal 
property, the tractors and the real property and all of 
that, and sold it and realized so that there was, say, only 
5,000 left, they could only then foreclose on enough catele 
to get the remaining five, and when they jeopardize that 
amount or make the amount lower than it should be, I think 
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this casts some doubt, at least some doubt, so there should 
be some estoppel at least as it concerns the amount. 
Reporter's Transcript at page 107, line 19 through page 108, line 
1. This is an issue which is particularly critical to Smithfield 
inasmuch as it is being sued for the balance now owing to 
Commercial Security Bank. This evidence supported the court's 
subsequent factual determination that a waiver or estoppel had 
occurred. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's judgment of dismissal should be sustained. 
The activities of Commercial Security Bank in accepting the 
checks from Smithfield Livestock Auction with a restrictive 
endorsement and crediting those to Erickson's account estops its 
claims against Smithfield. That estoppel arises not only by 
operation of the specific provisions of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, but based upon the actual handling of the instruments 
within the office of Commercial Security Bank. Officers 
themselves reviewed these checks and allowed them to be deposited 
in Ericksons account. This activity even apart from the specific 
structure of the Uniform Commercial Code gives rise to an 
estoppel on the part of the Bank to assert a* claim some three 
years later against Smithfield. There is also substantial 
evidence to justify a conclusion that the Bank acquiesced and 
permitted the occasional sales of livestock without assertion of 
its lien position. The subsequent dealings of CSB with 
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collateral also supports Smithfield defenses of waiver, estoppel 
and laches. 
It should be noted that this case was dismissed by the trial 
after presentation of Plaintiff's case in chief. Defendant has 
not yet introduced rebuttal testimony. The most that the 
Plaintiff should obtain as relief by this Court would be a remand 
to the trial court with instructions to proceed with rebuttal 
evidence on the part of the Defendant. 
DATED this (n day of April, 1987. 
DAINES & KANE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies, 
one copy being manually signed by me, of the foregoing Brief of 
Respondent this X day of April, 1987 to the following: 
JEFFREY WESTON SHIELDS 
Assistant General Counsel 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK 
50 South Main Street 
Suite 2011, CSB Tower 
P.O. Box 30815 
Salt Lake City, UT 84130 
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APPENDIX A 
A - 1 
COMMERCIAL PAPER 70A-3-204 
chaser took subject to equities. Lebcher v. Negotiable Instruments Law, this would not 
Lambert (1900) 23 U 1, 63 P 628, citing prevent a legally effective transfer of rights 
Norton on Bills and Notes; Pingree Nat. Bank under the note and mortgage by a separate 
of Ogden v. McFarland (1921) 57 U 410,195 P instrument in writing. Continental Bank & 
313. Trust Co. v. Cunningham (1960) 10 U 2d 329, 
* . „ * 353 P 2d 168. Separate instrument 
Separate writing does not constitute an Typewritten indorsement. 
indorsement where not attached to the note. Typewritten indorsement of check com-
Ackerman v. Bramwell Inv. Co. (1932) 80 U plied with former section 44-1-32. Pingree 
52, 12 P 2d 623, distinguished in 13 U 2d 256, Nat. Bank of Ogden v. McFarland (1921) 57 U 
372 P 2d 346. 410,195 P 313. 
Even though there was no negotiation of a 
note in accordance with the provisions of the 
70A-3-203. Wrong or misspelled name. Where an instrument is made 
payable to a person under a misspelled name or one other Ithan his own 
he may indorse in that name or his own or both; but signature in both 
names may be required by a person paying or giving value for the instru-
ment. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 3-203. 
r-~,« nAfAMMAM Construction and application of provision 
v/ross^rveierences* * VT A* ti T A A T J* 
. . of Negotiable Instruments Law regarding 
. » . Sni£uJiIt a P P e a r , n 8 o n instrument,
 e n d o r 8 e m e n t 0f instrument by payee or 
' '• endorsee whose name is wrongly designated 
Collateral References. or misspelled, 153 ALR 598. 
Bills and Notes $=> 181,183. Mistake in name in endorsement of check, 
10 CJS Bills and Notes §§ 204,208. preventing payment thereof before failure of 
11 AmJur 2d 372, Bills and Notes § 352. drawee, 21 ALR 1556. 
70A-3-204. Special indorsement — Blank indorsement. 
(1) A special indorsement specifies the person to whom or to whose 
order it makes the instrument payable. Any instrument specially 
indorsed becomes payable to the order of the special indorsee and 
may be further negotiated only by his indorsement. 
(2) An indorsement in blank specifies no particular indorsee and may 
consist of a mere signature. An instrument payable to order and 
indorsed in blank becomes payable to bearer and may be negotiated 
by delivery alone until specially indorsed. 
(3) The holder may convert a blank indorsement into a special indorse-
ment by writing over the signature of the indorser in blank any 
contract consistent with the character of the indorsement. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 3-204. Collateral References. 
Cross-Rcferences B i l l s a n d N o t e s * * 188"190-
\T ™ierence*' 10 CJS Bills and Notes §§ 212-214. 
Negotiation of instrument, 70A-3-202.
 n A m J u r 2 d 382, 423, Bills and Notes 
§§360,361,395. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Effect of blank indorsement. A note indorsed in blank is as though it 
had been originally made payable to bearer. 
Karren v. Bair (1924) 63 U 344, 225 P 1094. 
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70A-3-205. Restrictive indorsements. An indorsement is restrictive 
which either 
(a) is conditional; or 
(b) purports to prohibit further transfer of the instrument; or 
(c) includes the words "for collection," "for deposit," "pay any bank," 
or like terms signifying a purpose of deposit or collection; or 
(d) otherwise states that it is for the benefit or use of the indorser or 
of another person. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 3-205. -
Cross-References. 
Conversion of instruments, 70A-3-419, 
70A-4-203. 
Depositary bank taking item for collection 
may supply missing indorsement, 70A-4-205. 
Effect of restrictive indorsement, 
70A-3-206. 
Negotiation of instrument, 70A-3-202. 
Notice to purchaser, 70A-3-304. 
Payment or satisfaction of instrument, 
70A-3-603. 
Collateral References. 
Bills and Notes <£» 190. 
10 CJS Bills and Notes § 214. 
11 AmJur 2d 384, Bills and Notes § 362. 
Endorsement, "to the order of any bank or 
banker," as a restrictive endorsement, 10 
ALR 709. 
Undertaking of one who endorses a note 
without recourse, 2 ALR 216, 91 ALR 399. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Conditional delivery. 
Indorsement of a note before delivery to 
the payee may be conditional, but to be bind-
ing on the payee such conditions must be 
accepted by him, made with notice to him or 
knowledge on his part before or accompany-
ing delivery, and these facts must be pleaded 
and proved. Farmers' & Stockgrowers' Bank 
v. Pahvant Valley Land Co. (1917) 50 U 35, 
165 P 462. 
Effect of recitals in deposit slip. 
Where check is deposited at a bank, the 
deposit slip of which contains usual recitals 
that such bank acts merely as the agent for 
collection, and not as a purchaser thereof, 
title to check does not pass to said bank; nor 
does fact that the drawee bank credited bank 
of deposit with the check in controversy pre-
clude depositor from prevailing as a pre-
ferred creditor upon the insolvency of latter 
bank. Western Creamery Co. v. Malia (1936) 
89 U 422, 57 P 2d 743, distinguished in 11 U 
2d 89, 355 P 2d 210. 
70A-3-206. Effect of restrictive indorsement. 
(1) No restrictive indorsement prevents further transfer or negotiation 
of the instrument. 
(2) An intermediary bank, or a payor bank which is not the depositary 
bank, is neither given notice nor otherwise affected by a restrictive 
indorsement of any person except the bank's immediate transferor 
or the person presenting for payment. 
(3) Except for an intermediary bank, any transferee under an indorse-
ment which is conditional or includes the words "for collection," 
"for deposit," "pay any bank," or like terms (subparagraphs (a) and 
(c) of section 70A-3-205) must pay or apply any value given by him 
for or on the security of the instrument consistently with the 
indorsement and to the extent that he does so he becomes a holder 
for value. In addition such transferee is a holder in due course if 
he otherwise complies with the requirements of section 70A-3-302 
on what constitutes a holder in due course. 
(4) The first ta 
or another 
or apply ar 
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(4) The first taker under an indorsement for the benefit of the indorser 
or another person (subparagraph (d) of section 70A-3-205) must pay 
or apply any value given by him for or on the security of the instru-
ment consistently with the indorsement and to the extent that he 
does so he becomes a holder for value. In addition such taker is 
a holder in due course if he otherwise complies with the require-
. ments of section 70A-3-302 on what constitutes a holder in due 
course. A later holder for value is neither given notice nor other-
wise affected by such restrictive indorsement unless he has knowl-
edge that a fiduciary or other person has negotiated the instrument 
in any transaction for his own benefit or otherwise in breach of 
duty (subsection (2) of section 70A-3-304). 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 3-206. 11 AmJur 2d 435, Bills and Notes § 408. 
Cross-References. Endorsement "for deposit only" as affect-
Conversion of instrument, 70A-3-419, ing right of holder of paper against drawer 
70A-4-203. or maker who would have a good defense as 
Depositary bank taking item for collection against payee, 75 ALR 1415. 
may supply missing indorsement, 70A-4-205. Endorsement, 'To the order of any bank or 
Effect of discharge against holder in due banker," as a restrictive endorsement, 10 
course, 70A-3-602. ALR 709. 
Intermediary bank and payor bank, notice For deposit only, endorser's liability on 
from prior indorsement, 70A-3-102 (3), endorsement to original, or subsequent, 
70A-4-105, 70A-4-205. endorsee, 60 ALR 866. 
Item indorsed "pay any bank," effect, Maker's endorsement of note payable to 
70A-4-201. himself without words of negotiability, 42 
Notice to purchaser, 70A-3-304. ALR 1067,50 ALR 426. 
Payment or satisfaction of instrument, Sale or negotiation for value of commercial 
70A-3-603. paper after it has been endorsed by the 
Restrictive indorsements, 70A-3-205. holder with a restrictive endorsement, as 
Rights of one not holder in due course, waiver of the restriction so as to entitle the 
70A-3-306. purchaser to recover thereon as a holder in 
„ „ . „ , due course, 149 ALR 318. 
Collateral References. 
Bills and Notes <£=> 190, 199, 250, 290 et Law Reviews. 
seq.,330. Restrictive Indorsement Under the Uni-
10 CIS Bills and Notes §§ 39, 214 et seq., form Commercial Code, 24 U. Pittsburgh L. 
220. Rev. 616. 
70A-3-207. Negotiation effective although it may be rescinded. 
(1) Negotiation is effective to transfer the instrument although the 
negotiation is 
(a) made by an infant, a corporation exceeding its powers, or 
any other person without capacity; or 
(b) obtained by fraud, duress or mistake of any kind; or 
(c) part of an illegal transaction; or 
(d) made in breach of duty. 
(2) Except as against a subsequent holder in due course such nego-
tiation is in an appropriate case subject to recission, the declara-
tion of a constructive trust or any other remedy permitted by law. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 3-207. Cross-References. 
Burden of establishing signatures, defenses 
and due course, 70A-3-307. 
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Preexisting indebtedness was a sufficient 
consideration for maker's obligation under 
note. Dern Inv. Co. v. Carbon County Land 
Co. (1938) 94 U 76,75 P 2d 660. 
Preexisting debt furnished value for 
indorsement of note by payee to another. 
Dern Inv. Co. v. Carbon County Land Co. 
(1938) 94 U 76,75 P 2d 660. 
The extinguishment of a preexisting, valid 
debt is a sufficient consideration for a check. 
Great American Indemnity Co. v. Berryessa 
(1952) 122 U 243,248 P 2d 367. 
What constitutes consideration. 
Where cashier and president of bank 
agreed to put up certain amounts of money 
to make up loss which bank had sustained, 
and avert ruin with which institution was 
threatened, and defendant cashier executed 
note and president advanced cash, held, 
execution of note was based on sufficient con-
sideration to support action by bank on note. 
Utah Nat. Bank of Salt Lake City v. Nelson 
(1910) 38 U 169, 111 P 907. 
Promise to pay debt from which promisor 
has been discharged in bankruptcy is suffi-
cient consideration for note. Merchants' Bank 
v. Goodfellow (1914) 44 U 349, 140 P 759; 
Merchants' Protective Assn. v. Popper (1922) 
59 U 470,204 P 107. 
The consideration need not be cash; checks 
are the equivalent. Payment may consist of 
anything constituting a valid consideration 
of sufficient value. Miller v. Marks (1914) 46 
U 257,148 P 412. 
Extension of time by payee is sufficient 
consideration. Assets Realization Co. v. 
Cardon (1928) 72 U 597,604,272 P 204. 
Where wife owned substantial interest in 
joint bank account, and husband executed 
note to wife at her request upon withdrawing 
substantial sum from such account to invest 
in hazardous business, and when it became 
due husband executed renewal note secured 
by mortgage on undivided one-half interest 
in property owned by them jointly, original 
note was supported by valuable considera-
tion, and hence, mortgage was not fraudulent 
as to creditors. Williams v. Peterson (1935) 
86 U 526,46 P 2d 674. 
70A-3-304. Notice to purchaser. 
(1) The purchaser has notice of a claim or defense if 
(a) the instrument is so incomplete, bears such visible evidence 
of forgery or alteration, or is otherwise so irregular as to call 
into question its validity, terms or ownership or to create an 
ambiguity as to the party to pay; or 
(b) the purchaser has notice that the obligation of any party is 
voidable in whole or in part, or that all parties have been 
discharged. 
(2) The purchaser has notice of a claim against the instrument when 
he has knowledge that a fiduciary has negotiated the instrument 
in payment of or as security for his own debt or in any transaction 
for his own benefit or otherwise in breach of duty. 
(3) The purchaser has notice that an instrument is overdue if he has 
reason to know 
(a) that any part of the principal amount is overdue or that 
there is an uncured default in payment of another instru-
ment of the same series; or 
(b) that acceleration of the instrument has been made; or 
(c) that he is taking a demand instrument after demand has 
been made or more than a reasonable length of time after 
its issue. A reasonable time for a check drawn and payable 
within the states and territories of the United States and the 
District of Columbia is presumed to be thirty days. 
(4) Knowledge of the following facts does not of itself give the pur-
chaser notice of a defense or claim 
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(5) 
(6) 
that the instrument is antedated or postdated; 
that it was issued or negotiated in return for an executory 
promise or accompanied by a separate agreement, unless the 
purchaser has notice that a defense or claim has arisen from 
the terms thereof; 
that any party has signed for accommodation; 
that an incomplete instrument has been completed, unless 
the purchaser has notice of any improper completion; 
that any person negotiating the instrument is or was a fidu-
ciary; 
that there has been default in payment of interest on the 
instrument or in payment of any other instrument, except 
one of the same series. 
The filing or recording of a document does not of itself constitute 
notice within the provisions of this chapter to a person who would 
otherwise be a holder in due course. 
To be effective notice must be received at such time and in such 
manner as to give a reasonable opportunity to act on it. 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 3-304. 
Cross-References. 
Alteration of instrument, 70A-3-407. 
Effect of discharge against holder in due 
course, 70A-3-602. 
Holder in due course, 70A-3-302. 
Notice to person or organization, 
70A-1-201. 
Other writings affecting instrument, 
70A-3-119. 
"Presumption" defined, 70A-1-201 (31). 
Promise or order, when unconditional, 
70A-3-105. 
Restrictive indorsement, effect of, 
70A-3-206. 
Transfer, right to indorsement, 70A-3-201. 
Duty of purchaser. 
To impose upon one who is offered com-
mercial paper the duty of inquiring in each 
instance whether obligations have been satis-
factorily performed by prior holders would so 
burden such transactions as to create 
insuperable impedimenta to the free 
exchange of negotiable paper, which is an 
indispensable part of modern business. 
Jaeger & Branch, Inc. v. Pappas (1967) 20 U 
2d 100, 433 P 2d 605. 
Presumption of good faith. 
In the absence of anything to warn him to 
the contrary one who takes a negotiable 
instrument as a holder in due course may 
assume that persons with whom he deals are 
themselves acting honestly and in good faith. 
Jaeger & Branch, Inc. v. Pappas (1967) 20 U 
2d 100,433 P 2d 605. 
Collateral References. 
Bills and Notes <3=> 332 et seq. 
10 CJS Bills and Notes § 321 et seq. 
11 AmJur 2d 453, Bills and Notes § 424 et 
seq. 
Addition of word indicating representative 
or fiduciary capacity after name of payee, 
endorser, or endorsee on commercial paper as 
charging transferee with notice of trust in 
favor of third parties or of defenses in 
maker, 61 ALR 1389. 
Endorsement without recourse as affecting 
character of endorsee or subsequent holder 
as holder in due course, 77 ALR 487. 
High rate of discount on sale as affecting 
status as holder in due course, 91 ALR 1139. 
Notation or memorandum on bill or note 
as affecting one's character as holder in due 
course, 34 ALR 1377. 
Notation or memorandum on bill or note 
as notice, 56 ALR 1373. 
Notice which has been forgotten as affect-
ing status as holder in due course, 89 ALR 2d 
1330. 
Public records as affecting one's character 
as a holder in due course of negotiable paper, 
37 ALR 860. 
Renewal of note after notice of defense as 
destroying bona fide character of holder, 35 
ALR 1294. 
Transferee of commercial paper given by 
purchaser of chattel and secured by condi-
tional sale, retention of title, or chattel mort-
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gage, as subject to defenses which chattel 
purchaser could assert against seller, 44 ALR 
2d 84. 
What constitutes, under the uniform nego-
tiable instruments law or commercial code, a 
reasonable time for taking a demand instru-
ment, so as to support the taker's status as 
holder in due course, 10 ALR 3d 1199. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Burden of proof. 
In action by indorsee on note defended by 
maker on ground of partial failure of consid-
eration between maker and payee, held bur-
den was on defendant to establish such 
defense, and to show notice of plaintiff of 
failure of consideration. Cole Banking Co. v. 
Sinclair (1908) 34 U 454, 98 P 411,131 Am St 
Rep 885. 
Demand note. 
A demand note does not become overdue 
note until lapse of reasonable time after 
indorsement. Idaho State Bank of Twin Falls, 
Idaho v. Hooper Sugar Co. (1929) 74 U 24, 276 
P 659, 68 ALR 969. 
Duress. 
Note and mortgage executed by bank cash-
ier and his wife under threats of criminal 
prosecution, held properly annulled on 
ground of duress. Payson Building & Loan 
Society v. Taylor (1935) 87 U 302, 48 P 2d 894. 
Findings. 
A finding that indorsee of a note was inno-
cent purchaser for value, without knowledge 
of any defect in or defense to the note, and 
acted in good faith in the transaction, has 
been held to be sufficient, though in nature of 
a conclusion. This is not, however, strictly in 
compliance with the Code respecting findings. 
Miller v. Marks (1914) 46 U 257,148 P 412. 
Fraud. 
Payee who obtains promissory note by 
fraudulent representations and sale of 
worthless animal to maker, and under oral 
agreement not to negotiate same, receives 
defective title thereto, but subsequent holder 
in due course may enforce same against 
maker. Utah Bond & Share Co. v. Chappel 
(1926) 68 U 530, 251 P 354. 
Plaintiff, a minor, was properly considered 
a holder in due course of note given as a 
result of dealings of plaintiffs father with 
defendant corporation, on which plaintiff 
brought suit where delivery was made by a 
party to the transaction resulting in the note, 
although not by the maker, where there was 
no showing of fraud in the transaction. 
Christensen v. Financial Service Co. (1963) 14 
U 2d 101, 377 P 2d 1010, 2 ALR 3d 1144. 
Notice before full amount paid. 
Former section 44-1-55, relating to notice 
before full amount paid, was not intended to 
have, nor did It have, any bearing on rights 
of an indorsee who received negotiable paper 
before maturity in due course, and without 
notice of infirmities. All that section was 
intended to accomplish was to limit the 
indorsee's recovery to the amount he had 
advanced before obtaining notice of some 
infirmity in the paper, and not to affect his 
fundamental relation to the debtor. Felt v. 
Bush (1912) 41 U 462,126 P 688. 
Under former section 44-1-55 an indorsee 
of a note who, in due course, and without 
notice of any defect therein, gave his check to 
indorser in payment thereof, but before pay-
ment of check received notice of infirmity in 
the note, and check was duly paid, such 
indorsee acquired note in due course, without 
notice, and was not bound to stop payment of 
check. Miller v. Marks (1914) 46 U 257,148 P 
412. 
Notice of breach of executory agreement. 
Notice of breach of terms of executory con-
tract in pursuance of which note was given 
does not affect bona fide purchaser without 
notice. Stephens v. Doxey (1921) 58 U 196,198 
P 261; Karren v. Bair (1924) 63 U 344, 225 P 
1094. 
Where negotiable note is consideration for 
executory contract and note is negotiated 
before the breach of the contract, breach of 
contract is not a defense to note in hands of 
holder in due course even if holder knew of 
the contract, since, for such defense to be 
available, holder must have known about the 
breach before purchasing the note. Karren v. 
Bair (1924) 63 U 344,225 P 1094. 
Notice of claim or defense. 
Transferee who came into possession of 
note with knowledge that it was fully 
intended by makers that note should be held 
by trust company in escrow without delivery 
until makers were relieved of their obligation 
to pay another note, held not an innocent 
purchaser for value, and not entitled to 
recover on note. De Garmo v. Kay (1918) 52 U 
231,173 P 129. 
In suit by corporation to cancel mortgage 
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tion had delivered note and mortgage to bank 
which assigned to defendant stockholder for 
value and before maturity, held, stockholder 
was holder in due course, and she did not 
take note and mortgage subject to any 
defenses that corporation or stockholder 
might have had against original payee. 
Huntington Roller Mills & Mfg. Co. v. Miller 
(1922) 60 U 236, 208 P 531. 
Bad faith is not established by showing 
that altered note was taken. Idaho State 
Bank of Twin Falls, Idaho v. Hooper Sugar 
Co. (1929) 74 U 24, 276 P 659, 68 ALR 969. 
Notice of defects or conditions. 
Merely because indorsee of a note for 
$2,500 paid $2,100 or $2,300 therefor raises no 
presumption of knowledge on his part of 
some infirmity in note. Miller v. Marks (1914) 
46 U 257,148 P 412. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 3-305. 
Cross-References. 
Alteration of instrument, 70A-3-407. 
Burden of establishing signatures, defenses 
and due course, 70A-3-307. 
Effect of discharge against holder in due 
course, 70A-3-602. 
Incomplete instruments, 70A-3-115. 
Notice of claim or defense, 70A-3-304 (1) 
(b). 
Reacquisition of instrument, 70A-3-208. 
Rights of one not holder in due course, 
70A-3-306. 
Transfer, right to indorsement, 70A-3-201. 
Respecting knowledge of defective title to 
negotiable instrument, fact that two corpora-
tions have-same officers does not necessarily 
result in imputation of knowledge of one to 
other as subsequent holder, where interests 
of two are adverse with respect to instru-
ment; but where one corporation is mere 
agent or instrumentality of other, knowledge 
is imputable. Utah Bond & Share Co. v. 
Chappel (1926) 68 U 530, 251 P 354. 
Suspicious circumstances or negligence, 
without more, are insufficient to charge pur-
chaser with notice of defect, since actual 
knowledge of facts concerning-defect or bad 
faith must be shown; but suspicious circum-
stances may be admitted in evidence as bear-
ing on good faith. National Bank of the 
Republic v. Beckstead (1926) 68 U 421, 250 P 
1033, overruling in part National Bank of the 
Republic v. Price (1923) 65 U 57,234 P 231. 
Recovery by holder of check. 
Where the maker of a bank check 
attempted to get a shipment of carpet from 
payee to him released by the creditor of the 
payee through the use of said check, and 
after such purpose had been accomplished 
the maker sought to renege on his commit-
ment to the payee's creditor by stopping pay-
ment on the check, the payee's creditor was 
entitled to recover from the maker as a 
holder in due course. Jaeger & Branch, Inc. v. 
Pappas (1967) 20 U 2d 100, 433 P 2d 605. 
Collateral References. 
Bills and Notes <8=> 327,363 et seq. 
10 CJS Bills and Notes §§ 301,482 et seq. 
11 AmJur 2d 426, 714, 732, 737, Bills and 
Notes §§ 398, 652, 666, 690. 
70A-3-305. Rights of a holder in due course. To the extent that a 
holder is a holder in due course he takes the instrument free from 
(1) all claims to it on the part of any person; and 
(2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the holder 
has not dealt except 
(a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple con-
tract; and 
(b) such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the trans-
action, as renders the obligation of the party a nullity; and 
(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the 
instrument with neither knowledge nor reasonable oppor-
tunity to obtain knowledge of its character or its essential 
terms; and 
(d) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and 
(e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when he 
takes the instrument. 
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ment. Simpson v. Denver & R. G. R. Co. 
(1913) 43 U 105,134 P 883, 46 LRA (NS) 1164, 
explained in 103 F 2d 190. 
Finance company, as drawer of checks, had 
no cause of action against defendant bank, as 
drawee, to obtain recredit of drawer's 
account for the amount of two checks which 
financed the purchase of an auto,-where the 
funds represented by the check reached the 
intended party, and the plaintiff-finance com-
pany received security for the loan it had 
made, even though one of the payee names 
the finance company placed on the checks 
was a nonexistent person, and the indorse-
ment by such person was a forgery. 
Blomquist v. Zions First Nat. Bank (1966) 18 
U 2d 65, 415 P 2d 213. 
Righto of bona fide holder. 
A bona fide holder without notice acquires 
no title to a negotiable instrument under a 
forged indorsement. The general rules appli-
cable to bona fide holders for value do not 
apply in such a case. Warren v. Smith (1909) 
35 U 455,100 P 1069,136 Am St Rep 1071. 
An action of trover lies without previous 
demand and refusal against one who pos-
sesses himself improperly of bill stolen from 
plaintiff or against one who receives payment 
even in good faith of such stolen bill under 
forged indorsement. Warren v. Smith (1909) 
35 U 455,100 P 1069,136 Am St Rep 1071. 
70A-3-405. Impostors — Signature in name of payee. 
(1) An indorsement by any person in the name of a named payee is 
effective if 
(a) an impostor by use of the mails or otherwise has induced the 
maker or drawer to issue the instrument to him or his con-
federate in the name of the payee; or 
(b) a person signing as or on behalf of a maker or drawer 
intends the payee to have no interest in the instrument; or 
(c) an agent or employee of the maker or drawer has supplied 
him with the name of the payee intending the latter to have 
no such interest. 
(2) Nothing in this section shall affect the criminal or civil liability of 
the person so indorsing. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 3-405. 
Crocs-References. 
Signature, authorized representative, 
70A-3-401, 70A-3-403. 
Unauthorized signature, negligence con-
tributing to, 70A-3-404, 70A-3-406. 
Collateral References. 
Bills and Notes <S=> 6, 32,182, 279. 
10 CJS Bills and Notes §§ 129,192, 220. 
10 AmJur 2d 606-610, Banks §§ 638-640. 
Bills and notes: nominal payee rule of UCC 
5 3-405 (1) (b), 92 ALR 3d 268. 
Construction and application of UCC 
13-405 (1) (a) involving issuance of nego-
tiable instrument induced by impostor, 92 
ALR 3d 608. 
Payee as holder in due course, 2 ALR 3d 
1115. 
Right of drawee of forged check or draft to 
recover amount paid thereon, 12 ALR 1089, 
71 ALR 337,121 ALR 1056. 
Right of previous holder of check paid by 
bank to take advantage of depositor's failure 
to examine vouchers, 17 ALR 956. 
Who must bear loss as between drawer or 
endorser, who delivers check to an impostor 
and one who purchases, cashes, or pays it 
upon the impostor's endorsement, 22 ALR 
1228, 81 ALR 2d 1365. 
70A-3-406. Negligence contributing to alteration or unauthorized 
signature. Any person who by his negligence substantially contributes to 
a material alteration of the instrument or to the making of an unauthor-
ized signature is precluded from asserting the alteration or lack of author-
ity against a holder in due course or against a drawee or other payor who 
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pays the instrument in good faith and in accordance with the reasonable 
commercial standards of the drawee's or payor's business. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 3-406. 
Cross-References. 
Alteration of instrument, 70A-3-407. 
"Good faith" defined, 70A-1-201 (19). 
Signature, how made, 70A-3-401. 
"Unauthorized" signature or indorsement 
defined, 70A-1-201 (43). 
Unauthorized signatures, effect, 70A-3-404. 
Collateral References. 
Alteration of Instruments <&=> 22; Bills and 
Notes <3=> 115, 453. 
3A CJS Alteration of Instruments § 80; 10 
CJS Bills and Notes § 484. 
10 AmJur 2d 589, Banks § 624; 11 AmJur 
2d 413, 789, Bills and Notes §§ 386, 710. 
Commercial paper: what amounts to 
"negligence contributing to alteration or 
unauthorized signature" under U. C. C. 
§ 3-406, 67 ALR 3d 144. 
Negligence in drawing check which facili-
tates alteration as to amount as affecting 
drawee's bank's liability, 42 ALR 2d 1070. 
Payee's prior negligence facilitating 
forging of endorsement as precluding recov-
ery from bank paying check, 87 ALR 2d 638. 
70A-3-407. Alteration. 
(1) Any alteration of an instrument is material which changes the con-
tract of any party thereto in any respect, including any such change 
in 
(a) the number or relations of the parties; or 
(b) an incomplete instrument, by completing it otherwise than 
as authorized; or 
(c) the writing as signed, by adding to it or by removing any 
part of it. 
(2) As against any person other than a subsequent holder in due course 
(a) alteration by the holder which is both fraudulent and mate-
rial discharges any party whose contract is thereby changed 
unless that party assents or is precluded from asserting the 
defense; 
(b) no other alteration discharges any party and the instrument 
may be enforced according to its original tenor, or as to 
incomplete instruments according to the authority given. 
(3) A subsequent holder in due course may in all cases enforce the 
instrument according to its original tenor, and when an incomplete 
instrument has been completed, he may enforce it as completed. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 3-407. 
Cross-References. 
Bank may charge customer's account in 
case of altered instrument, 70A-4-401. 
Burden of establishing signatures, defenses 
and due course, 70A-3-307. 
Effect of discharge against holder in due 
course, 70A-3-602. 
Holder in due course, rights of, 70A-3-305. 
Incomplete instruments, 70A-3-115. 
Notice to purchaser, 70A-3-304. 
Rights of one not holder in due course, 
70A-3-306. 
Collateral References. 
Alteration of Instruments <$=» 2 et seq.; 
Bills and Notes <£=> 378. 
3A CJS Alteration of Instruments §5 et 
seq.; 10 CJS Bills and Notes § 486. 
4 AmJur 2d 6 to 9, Alteration of Instru-
ments §§ 4 to 6; 11 AmJur 2d 108, Bills and 
Notes § 78. 
Alteration in check or other instrument of 
name of branch of bank as material, 174 ALR 
299. 
Alteration of commercial paper by 
reducing the amount, 9 ALR 1087. 
Alteration of ' 
ing on principal, 51 
Alteration of note 
as affecting parties 
consent, 44 ALR 1244 
Detachment of 
nature or terms of 
signed or endorsed 
532. 
Erasing 
alteration of' 
Figures showing 
paper, alteration of, 
words, 64 ALR 2d 
Indication of 
transferee's character 
course, 171 ALR 798 
Liability of party 
drawn as to be easily 
22 ALR 1139, 36 ALR 
Authorized alterations 
A payee who is 
reason, the amount 
may fill in the blank 
without explicit 
Plescia v. Humphries 
2d 1124. 
Where a payee 
note pursuant to a 
to the due date tl 
maker gave no explicit 
to write the due date 
rial. Plescia v. Humph 
241 P 2d 1124. 
Effect of alteration 
An altered note is 
not a due course hol< 
Twin Falls, Idaho v 
74 U 24, 276 P 659, 68 
While a material 
defense to an action 
in order that such ar 
to recovery on the 
tion, it must appear 
made with fraudulenl 
Bank of Twin Falls 
Co. (1929) 74 U 24, 276 
Express authority. 
Mortgagors ratified 
gage broker completed 
ing four extensions 
they acquired actual 
had been given a one 
rather than a twenty 
of express authority 
irrelevant and they 
reformation and 
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Holder in due course, rights of, 70A-3-302, 
70A-3-305. 
Notice to purchaser, 70A-3-304. 
Collateral References. 
Bills and Notes <S=> 383, 440. 
10 CJS Bills and Notes §§ 438 et seq., 510. 
11 AmJur 2d 735, Bills and Notes § 670. 
70A-3-603. Payment or satisfaction. 
(1) The liability of any party is discharged to the extent of his pay-
ment or satisfaction to the holder even though it is made with 
knowledge of a claim of another person to the instrument unless 
prior to such payment or satisfaction the person making the claim 
either supplies indemnity deemed adequate by the party seeking 
the discharge or enjoins payment or satisfaction by order of a court 
of competent jurisdiction in an action in which the adverse claim-
ant and the holder are parties. This subsection does not, however, 
result in the discharge of the liability 
(a) of a party who in bad faith pays or satisfies a holder who 
acquired the instrument by theft or who (unless having the 
rights of a holder in due course) holds through one who so 
acquired it; or 
(b) of a party (other than an intermediary bank or a payor bank 
which is not a depositary bank) who pays or satisfies the 
holder of an instrument which has been restrictively 
indorsed in a manner not consistent with the terms of such 
restrictive indorsement. 
(2) Payment or satisfaction may be made with the consent of the 
holder by any person including a stranger to the instrument Sur-
render of the instrument to such a person gives him the rights of 
a transferee (section 70A-3-201). 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 3-603. 
Cross-References. 
Discharge of parties, 70A-3-601. 
Impairment of recourse or of collateral, 
70A-3-606. 
Payment by accommodation party, effect, 
70A-3-415 (5). 
Reacquisition of instrument by prior party, 
70A-3-208. 
Restrictive indorsements, 70A-3-205. 
Rights of one not holder in due course, 
70A-3-306 (d). 
Tender of payment, 70A-3-604. 
Transfer, right to indorsement, 70A-3-201. 
CoUateral References. 
Bills and Notes <£» 408, 426 et seq. 
10 CJS Bills and Notes § 438 et seq. 
11 AmJur 2d 1015, Bills and Notes § 963 et 
seq. 
Acceptance of renewal note made or 
endorsed by personal representative of obli-
gor in original paper as payment or novation 
of that paper, 12 ALR 1546. 
Accord and satisfaction by endorsement 
and transfer of commercial paper by agent 
having no authority to compromise, 46 ALR 
1523. 
Discharge of accommodation maker by 
release of mortgage or other security given 
for note, 2 ALR 2d 260. 
Failure or delay by holder of note to 
enforce collateral security as releasing 
endorser, surety, or guarantor, 74 ALR 129. 
Presumption as to payment or discharge of 
obligation from obligor's possession of paper 
evidencing it, 156 ALR 777. 
Renewal note as discharging original obli-
gation or indebtedness, 52 ALR 1416. 
Rights and remedies of accommodation 
party to paper as against accommodated 
party after payment, 36 ALR 553, 77 ALR 
668. 
Right to have usurious payments made on 
previous obligation applied as payment of 
principal on renewal, 13 ALR 1244. 
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(1) Any part 
it is due 
interest, i 
(2) The hold 
who has J 
(3) Where t l 
than on c 
specified ; 
History: L. 1965, 
Cross-References. 
Discharge of partie 
Presentment, how I 
Presentment, notic 
test, when necess 
70A-3-501. 
70A-3-605. CJ 
(1) The hold* 
charge an 
(a) in t 
ind 
the 
stri 
(b) by 
or 
cha 
Neither c 
instrumen 
(2) 
History: L. 1965, c 
Cross-References. 
Discharge of parties 
Effect of discharge 
course, 70A-3-602. 
Verbal discharge agi 
Maker of note was 1 
there was no written 
no consideration for r 
note was never delive 
maker's claim that 
released him from obli 
Chappell (1967) 20 U 2< 
70A-3-606. Im 
(1) The holdei 
that withoi 
APPENDIX B 
B - 1 
as checks from Smithfield Livestock Auction to Mr. Erickson; 
correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q Okay. Were those checks all deposited in your 
account? 
A That's correct. 
Q All right. 
A I think with the exception that there may have 
been a couple at the end that went to Golden Spike, because 
he did close his account with us. 
Q How is a check of say a $2,000 amount handled at 
Bear River State Bank? I mean what do you do with it? When 
I deposit a check, what's done with it? 
A Well, we only reviewed the deposits that were over 
$5,000. So these deposits, you know, an officer wouldn't 
have seen them. 
Q An officer wouldn't have seen them? 
A No. 
Q But explain the procedure that happened with the 
check. 
-A He would have taken it to a teller and she'd have 
run it through the work and gone to the computer center. 
Q Do you know what a restrictive endorsement is? 
A Yes. 
Q What is a restrictive endorsement? 
A It means that it can only be cashed by a certain 
party or under certain conditions, 
Q Okay. And what will a teller do when she sees a 
restrictive endorsement? 
A She would, you know, see what the restrictions 
were and take it to an officer. 
Q Is that the standard practice in your bank? 
A On a restriction, yes. 
Q That is, if I give the bank a restrictive endorse-
ment check, the teller will look at it, as soon as she 
identifies it as a restrictive endorsement what is she to do? 
A She's to check and see what the restrictions are, 
and if they're met and it's within her check cashing limits, 
then she would process it. If it's not—it depends if the 
check is presented for cash or deposit. 
Q Well, let's say it's entered for just deposit. 
Okay? 
A Okay. 
Q A check comes in for $2,000 with a restriction on 
it. For example—correct me, you're the banker—but a 
restrictive endorsement such as my signature on this check 
waives any mechanic liens against such-and-such a person's 
house. 
A Okay. ... ^,,*,*^_ 
Q And the teller gets that kind of a check. What 
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should she do with it? 
A Well, mechanic's liens I think are different than 
what we're talking about in this case. 
Q Well, just answer that question. That is a 
restrictive endorsement, isn't it? 
A That's correct. 
Q Okay. What should she do with that? 
A Well, on a mechanic's lien she would have to see 
the chit that the work had been performed before— 
Q Would the teller make that decision? 
A No, she wouldn't. 
Q She'd take it to an officer? 
A That's correct. 
Q You've financed car dealerships, haven't you? 
A Yes. 
Q And you take liens on cars, don't you? 
A That's correct. 
Q What if a person buys a car from the car dealer-
ship, say Wilson Motor, and the individual puts on that 
check, "This payment is made in release of any liens or 
encumbrances on this automobile," and your bank finances 
Wilson's vehicles and that endorsement comes in. What shoul4 
the teller do with tht check? 
A I lost your— 
Q Wilson Motor Company sometimes finances cars. 
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They have cars in the ir inventory and t h e y ' l l finance them 
with, say, Commercial Security Bank? right? 
A Okay. 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
And an individual writes a check to Wilson Motor, 
$3,000, for a new car and puts on that check, "This check is 
payment in full for all liens and encumbranees on automobile /| 
such-and-such," and then Wilson Motor endorses that check 
and wants to deposit it in your bank, and you know the bank 
has a lien on their car. What should the teller do? Is 
that a restrictive endorsement? 
A That's correct. 
Q What should the teller do? 
A Well, I would think she would normally take it to 
an officer, if you're talking about an automobile for a 
check that size, she'd take to an officer. 
Q Why? 
For protection. 
For protection for who? 
For the bank. 
For the bank. Because the bank, by accepting that 
check, depositing it and then using it, as a collecting 
bank may release any lien it has on Wilson's automobile; 
right? 
A That's correct. 
Let me take the example one step further. Let's 
./ 
say the hank has a lien on cattle. Okay? 
A Okay. 
Q And an individual comes in with, a check and this 
individual owes the bank money on cattle and the check has 
on it, "Payment of this check is release of any and all 
liens and encumbrances against the cattle, and if there is 
a lien and encumbrance the individual warrants this money 
will go to the bank that has the loan, signed William 
Erickson.H 
What should the teller do with such a check as 
that? 
A Like I say, she would look to see who the check is 
payable to. 
Q The check is payable to William C. Erickson, and 
he signed that endorsement and takes it into your bank and 
wants to deposit it. 
A So she would take it and most likely it would go 
to the officer and they'd look at it. 
Q What officer would look at it? 
A Generally the operations officer. 
Q Who would that be? 
A In our bank it was Elaine Madsen. 
Q If you saw that kind of an endorsement on a check, 
Mr. Yeates, made payable to William C. Erickson from 
Smithfield Livestock Auction, what would you do? Would you 
allow that check to be deposited in Mr. Erickson's account 
and allow him to draw those funds out? 
MR. SHIELDS: Your Honor/ I need to make another 
objection outside of our original premise, and that is that 
I think his whole line of questioning is calling for a legal 
conclusion from the witness based on the legal effect of 
endorsement, restrictive endorsement and cashing procedure. 
That's all covered by Article 4 of the Code and clearly is 
asking for legal conclusions in spite of the fact that itfs 
masked as a hypothetical question. 
THE COURT: I don't think he's asking him what the 
legal conclusion is or what the—I think hels just saying, 
"What would you do under those circumstances?" 
MR. SHIELDS: Well, I think nonetheless—I can 
leave it at that. It's eliciting the legal effect of an en-
dorsement. 
THE COURT: I don'14ie Office d him that. I think he 
just asked him, "What would you do if the teller brought it 
to you?" 
MR. DAINES: That's right, Your Honor. First we 
establish that a teller—that they have a bank procedure, 
what the teller should do, and then who looks at it. 
THE COURT: Well, not necessarily what they should 
do but generally what they do. 
MR. DAINES: That's right. 
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THE COURT: He's asked you, "What would you do?" 
A What was the last question? 
Q Well, the last question is: "If you were brought 
such a restrictive endorsement, as an officer of the bank 
would you allow Mr. Erickson to deposit those funds in his 
checking account and disburse them for whatever purpose he 
chose? 
A Probably not. 
Q Would you expect your operations officer to do 
that? 
A The operations officer, you know, probably wouldn't) 
have any idea that we had a lien on them. 
Q Well, now wait a minute. Doesn't the operations 
officer know about all of your loans? 
A No. 
Q Doesn't your operations officer know who the 
borrowers at the bank are? 
A No. 
Q Who plugs in these computer things? 
A Well, they're two different departments of the 
bank. 
Q Okay. Well, let's say your operations officer 
sees such a restrictive endorsement. What should that 
individual then do? 
A Well, they would look to see who the check is pay-
able to, because it would be payable to both parties, the 
parties that had the restriction as well as the person that 
owned the cattle. The check should be payable to both 
parties, and so they would look to see, you know, if it's 
payable— 
Q What if it's payable to William C. Erickson? 
A Then they would take it where he'd signed it that 
there were no encumbrances on it. 
Q Even though the bank has an encumbrance? 
A Well, the operations officer would have no idea 
that the bank had an encumbrance. 
Q You do, but the operations officer doesn't? 
A That's correct. 
Q Now, Mr. Yeates, how big a bank is Bear River 
State 3ank? 
A At that time it was about a little over a $20 
million bank. 
Q How many employees? 
A Over twenty. 
Q How many officers? 
A Five. 
Q Were you one of the officers? 
A Yes. 
Q And you're telling me that in a bank of five 
officers that the operations officer doesn't know who owes 
the bank money? 
A That's correct. Because of the sheer size. 
Q Pardon me? 
A Because of the sheer size of the bank. 
Q I want you to take a look at one of those checks 
of Smithfield Livestock Auction, Mr. Yeates. Have you got 
it? 
A Yes. 
Q I want you to look at the back of it and read the 
restrictive endorsement. First tell me if that is a 
restrictive endorsement. 
A Yes. 
Q What does it say? 
A Have you got a magnifying glass? Thank you. 
"In executing my endorsement of this check, I do sell to 
the Smithfield Livestock Auction, Incorporated, the herein 
described livestock, and I guarantee that I am the owner of 
said livestock and that said livestock are clear of all 
mortgages, liens, or encumbrances. If livestock are mort-
gaged, mortgagee's endorsement or release of mortgage is 
required. Please endorse below." 
Q Okay. Does that endorsement require an endorse-
ment by the bank in order to take those funds, Mr. Yeates? 
Is it a restrictive endorsement? 
A Yes. 
Q Whose signatures are required to endorse that 
check? 
A The payee, 
Q Oh? Who does it say is required to endorse those 
checks? 
A Well, it says—let's read it again. "In executing 
my endorsement of this check"—see, the person it's payable 
to— 
Q Read the second sentence, Mr. Yeates. 
A Okay. It's only one sentence. 
Q Read the second part that pertains to the mortgagee 
Who is the mortgagee anyway? Is it the bank? 
A Well, it would have to be named on the front of the 
check/ otherwise no one would have any knowledge. 
Q Well, you knew who was the mortgagee of these 
cattle. 
A No one else would. 
Q Just you? 
A Just the lending institution. 
Q Okay. And you're the one that's getting the check, 
with the restrictive endorsement on? 
A But it's a different department of the bank. 
Q Okay, it's a different department. Read us the 
second part. What does it say where it discusses what is 
required from the mortgagee? 
1 A See if I can find a better copy here. Let's see. 
2 »i am the owner of said livestock and that said livestock 
3
 are clear of all mortgages, liens, or encumbrances." 
4
 I guess maybe there was a period there. Okay. 
5 "if livestock are mortgaged, mortgagee's endorsement or 
6
 release of mortgage is required." 
7 Q NOW let's just assume for a moment that these are 
8 the cows that you've got in your security agreement. Who is 
9 required to sign that check by the terms of that restrictive 
10 endorsement, Mr. Yeates? 
11 MR. SHIELD: Your Honor, at this point the docu-
12 ment. speaks for itself. We have a document in evidence and 
13 it's its own— 
14 MR. DAINES: I think we're entitled to inquire, 
15
 Your Honor. 
18
 THE COURT: Well, are you asking him who is 
17
 required or who— 
18
 MR. DAINES: Pursuant to the terms of that. 
19
 THE COURT: —or who he would think has— 
20
 MR. DAINES: Well, the terms of the restrictive 
21
 J endorsement. Do you claim a mortgage on cattle, Mr. Yeates? 
A Pardon? 
Q Do you claim a mortgage on Mr. Erickson's cattle? 
24
 A Yes. 
25
 Q Are you a mortgagee? 
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A That's correct. 
Q Would that endorsement require your signature for 
negotiation of that check? 
A No one would know unless we were named as a joint 
payee• 
Q Well, you know you're the mortgagee. 
A But what if he took the check someplace else to 
deposit it or cash it? 
Q What if he did? But he didn't, did he? 
A He could have done. 
Q But he didn't. He took it to your own bank, 
didn't he? 
A No. Like I say', there were some that were deposited] 
at Golden Spike. 
Q There was one; right? 
MR. SHIELDS: I make a relevancy objection here, 
not on our previous discussion. 
THE COURT: Yeah. I'll sustain the objection, 
because you're asking him to admit they'd have to endorse 
it. You can ask him what he thinks this does. 
Q Is it a restrictive endorsement, Mr. Yeates? 
A Yes. 
Q All right. 
MR. SHIELDS: Excuse me, Your Honor. If I could 
just follow up on that briefly. The problem is the law is 
very clear that a check needs only to be endorsed by the 
payee. Now, I'm going to make an objection based on that 
and with, that legal—with that statute in the State of Utah 
the remainder becomes irrelevant* 
MR. DAINES: Your Honor, that's absolutely wrong. 
A restrictive endorsement is just that. The check can only 
be negotiated by complying with the restrictions, which is 
what Mr. Yeates told us. That's what a restrictive endorse-
ment is. 
THE COURT: I'm having the same problem that you 
had av/hile back and that Mr. Yeates has, and that is I can't 
really— 
MR. DAINES: You know what it says. I'll have 
him present it on the board over here. Will you do that? 
I'll give you a check and you can do that. I'll submit 
this and I think we can stipulate to that, Your Honor, is 
that it's a heck of a lot more clear on the check itself. 
We don't have one of those checks, do we? 
FROM THE COURTROOM: No. 
THE COURT: If you've got one that's fairly 
clear, we can send it out and I'll have my secretary type 
it out. 
MR. DAINES: Okay. Should we take a recess for 
five minutes and have that done, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes, Because I'm not sure exactly 
what that says. I've got a different idea and you have a 
different idea and Mr. Shields has a different idea and 
Mr. Yeates has a different idea. We have four different 
ideas of what it's saying, at least from what I got out of 
it, but if we can take that and have it printed so we can 
all read it, we'll do that. 
CCourt recessed for about ten minutes. 
Following the recess:) 
THE COURT: Does this look like what it says? 
MR. DAINES: Yeah. Do you have a copy too, Your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. DAINES: I guess we only have three copies. 
May I borrow yours, Counsel? 
MR. SHIELDS: You bet. 
MR. DAINES: Your copy or mine or whatever. 
Q CBy Mr. Daines of Mr. Yeates). Mr. Yeates, I'm 
directing your attention to the last sentence of that 
restrictive endorsement. First of all can you identify 
that as a restrictive endorsement? 
A Yes. 
Q Now what are the terms of handling restrictive 
endorsements in order to endorse and cash the check? Does 
one need to comply with the restrictive endorsement? 
11 
12 
1 A That's correct. 
2 Q And anyone who accepts a check where the restric-
3
 tive endorsement is not complied with will be liable for the 
4
 amount of that check; is that correct? 
5 MR. SHIELDS: That is a legal conclusion. 
6 MR. DAINES: But it's a conclusion within a bank 
7
 officer's knowledge, Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: I'm not sure that I understand your 
9
 question. You're saying that the person who endorses i t — 
10 MR. DAINES: Receives a check improperly endorsed 
is responsible for cashing the check and can be liable for 
those funds* I'll go through it step by step. 
13 Q Is it a restrictive endorsement, Mr. Yeates? 
14
 A That's correct. 
15 Q who guarantees an endorsement when it's passed on 
to the receiving bank? Does the collecting bank guarantee 
17
 | the endorsement? 
A It goes back to the most—to the previous endorse-
ment , I think. 
Q I understand what you're saying. But let's say a 
check is forged. 
A Okay. 
23
 Q And the forger brings it into a bank and the bank 
24
 pays out the funds on that forged check and then the bank— 
and that's called the collecting bank—send it on to a 
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 ' receiving bank; right? 
2
 I A Okay. 
3
 | Q That then disburses money out of that person's 
account. Is the receiving bank then entitled to back charge 
the collecting bank? 
A The receiving is the bank on which it's drawn? 
Q Yes. 
8
 | A Okay. So the answer to your question would be 
the collecting bank. 
Q That's right. And the collecting bank is 
responsible if it can't catch the forger; right? 
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 I A That's correct . 
13
 ' Q And you know that because t h a t ' s the way things 
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are handled? 
A That's right. 
Q Is the same true also of endorsements that are 
restrictive? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. So the collecting bank has to guarantee 
endorsements, doesn't it? 
A That's correct. 
Q Who was the collecting bank on all of these 
Smithfield Livestock Auction checks? 
A Most of them, Bear River State Bank. 
Q With the exception of one of them it was 3ear 
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River State Bank; isn't that right? 
A That's correct. 
Q So did the Bear River State Bank guarantee these 
endorsements, that the restriction had been complied with? 
A Yes. 
Q That's how it's handled in the normal channels of 
commerce? 
A That's correct. 
Q Now I want to call your attention to the last 
sentence of the endorsement. It says, "If livestock are 
mortgaged, mortgagee's endorsement or release of mortgage is 
required." What is an endorsement? 
A It's signing the check. 
Q Signing the check. Do any of these checks bear— 
well, first of all, do you claim the livestock are mort-
gaged? 
A Yes. 
Q Is Commercial Security Bank's endorsement required 
on that check? 
A No. The check only requires the endorsement of 
the payees. 
Q No, I want to ask you, doesn't the restriction 
require the mortgagee's endorsement? 
A But there would be no way of knowing who the 
mortgagee is unless they're named as a payee also. 
Q Unless the collecting bank happened to be the 
mortgagee. Then it would know, wouldn't it? 
A Nof it would not necessarily know. 
Q You're saying that within a big bank one hand 
doesn't know what the other hand does? 
A That's correct. 
Q But has the restriction in this case been complied • 
with? 
A As far as the world is concerned, yes. 
O No, as far as this endorsement, it requires your 
endorsement on the check, doesn't it? 
A No, it doesn't, because we're not named as the. 
payee. 
Q But you've told us you have to comply with a 
restrictive endorsement. 
A That's correct. 
Q Then your bank is responsible to see that you do 
comply with it; right? 
A That's correct. 
Q Okay. Now I submit to you it would be a different 
case if it was Golden Spike Bank, but your tellers and your 
operations officer didn't have to go far to find out whether 
those cattle were mortgaged, did they? 
A Yes. 
Q Eow far would they have to go? 
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 A They have no idea what's going on in the lending— 
2
 Q They had no idea William C. Erickson had a loan 
3
 I with you? 
A That's correct. 
5
 Q No idea whatsoever? 
6
 A I feel safe in saying that. 
7
 Q How difficult would it have been to inquire? 
8
 A Very. As busy as they are. 
9
 I Q You mean they would have had to walk across the 
room and ask you? 
A Itls not in the normal course of business to do it. 
12
 I Q Could they have found out by asking you? 
13
 I A They could, but tfiey would have no reason to. 
Q You agree that the endorsement has not been com-
plied with? 
A No, I say the endorsement has been complied with. 
Q Mr. Yeates, did you ever, by March or April of 
1983, were you aware that Mr. Erickson had sold some of his 
livestock? 
A Yes. He told me he'd liquidated the whole herd. 
Q I don't know what he told you. I just asked, are 
you aware of that? 
* A Yes. 
Q Were you aware of where they had he.en sold through^ 
A Not at that point, no. 
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